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THE SEXUAL ORIENTATION OF A PARENT AS A FACTOR WHEN 
CONSIDERING CARE 
 
C Feldhaus* 
C van den Heever** 
 
Every child in South Africa is protected by the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996,1 and more importantly, by the provisions of section 28. Section 28(2) 
of the Constitution states that a child's best interests are of paramount importance in 
every matter concerning the child. The principle of the best interests of the child is 
also contained in section 9 of the Children's Act,2 which provides that in all matters 
concerning the care, protection and well-being of a child the standard that the child's 
best interests is of paramount importance must be applied. 
 
Section 9 of the Constitution contains the equality clause, which establishes the legal 
equality of all persons in South Africa. According to this section, everyone is 
considered equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of 
the law. Several grounds are listed in this provision relating to the unfair 
discrimination of persons, either directly or indirectly, by the State or any natural 
person. One of these grounds is a person's sexual orientation. 
  
The fundamental guiding principle concerning care disputes and all matters involving 
children is that a child's best interests are of paramount importance.3 Determining 
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**  Chantelle van den Heever. LLB, LLM (NWU). Candidate-Attorney at Savage Hurter, Randburg.  
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Van den Heever C The Sexual Orientation of a Parent as a Factor for Consideration in the 
Granting of Care (LLM North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus). 
1  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution) 
which came into force on 4 February 1997.  
2  Children's Act 38 of 2005 (hereafter referred to as the Children's Act). 
3  DM v SM 2008 2 NR 704 (HC) 705G-I (hereafter referred to as DM v SM). See also Christian 
Education South-Africa v Minister of Education 2000 10 BCLR (CC) para 41; Minister for Welfare 
Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 7 BCLP 713 (CC) para 17; Du Toit v Minister of 
Population Development (Lesbian and Gay Equality Project as Amicus Curiae) 2003 2 SA 198 
(CC) para 20; Bannatyne v Bannatyne  2003 2 SA 363 (CC); De Reuck v Director of Public 
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what care arrangements will serve the best interests of the child involves the court 
in making a value judgement based on its findings of fact in its exercise of inherent 
jurisdiction as the upper guardian of minor children.4 In divorce proceedings where 
children are involved, it is the duty of the court to decide on the refuge of the 
children after the dissolution of the marriage. The final decision in the granting of 
care lies with the court, and it is here that principle of the best interests of the child5 
is strictly applied. The decision taken by the court in granting care to a parent or 
other person has a significant impact on the lives of children and can influence their 
future substantially, not only in the short term but also in the long term.   
 
The best interests of every child cannot be determined absolutely, and several 
factors or criteria to be taken into account in a range of matters relating to the well-
being of children have been developed over time by means of case law6 and 
legislation.7 These includes factors such as the ability of a parent to provide the 
basic needs of a child, such as food, clothes, shelter and other material needs, and 
the love, affection and other emotional ties that exist between the parent and the 
child.  
 
A question that arises in the determination of the best interests of the child is 
whether equal attention should be given to every possible aspect and consideration 
pertaining to the child's life, or whether certain considerations could be of less 
concern.8 Should the court take into account factors such as the significantly higher 
salary of one party, and therefore the ability to provide better schooling, medical 
                                                                                                                                                        
Prosecutions 2003 12 BCLR 1333 (CC) para 55; and S v S (Centre for Child Law as Amicus 
Curiae) 2011 7 BCLR 740 (CC). 
4  DM v SM 705G-I. 
5 For a discussion of whether the best interest principle is a standard or a right see Boezaart 
"General Principles" 2-10 to 2-14. 
6 In McCall v McCall 1994 3 SA 201 (C) a comprehensive, open-ended list of guiding factors or 
criteria was set out. 
7  Section 7 of the Children's Act contains a closed list of factors to be taken into account. 
8  Mahlobogwane 2005 Codicillus 31-32. 
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care and a less dangerous environment?9 Or should other factors such as the parties' 
sexual orientation, race, religion or ethnical origin be preferred?10 
 
The issue of the sexual orientation of a parent as a factor for consideration in the 
granting of care has, over the years, brought forward several problems. A range of 
rights could potentially be prejudiced, and a possibility arises that unfair 
discrimination against a parent on one or more grounds, including his/her sexual 
orientation, may occur.11 By contrast, a child's best interests should also be taken 
into account, and every child must be given the opportunity to be brought up in the 
best environment possible. Several positive as well as negative debates pertaining to 
the issue of homosexuality have risen, and although the vast majority of them have 
related to the religious aspects thereof, surveys have shown that the majority of the 
South African population is uncomfortable with the idea of homosexuality.12 The Zulu 
King, Goodwill Zwelithini,13 has described homosexuality as "un-African", and stated 
that it confuses children. It has also been argued that traditional, essential family 
values are being diminished, and a home in which persons of the same sex live 
together is not the most suitable environment in which to raise a child.14  
 
In the pre-1994 case of Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen,15 a mother who was involved in 
a lesbian relationship and shared a home and room with her partner approached the 
court for an order granting her access to her children.16 The children, at that stage, 
                                                 
9  Mahlobogwane 2005 Codicillus 31-32. 
10  Mahlobogwane 2005 Codicillus 30. See Heaton 2009 JJS 1-18 for an evaluation of the individual 
factors that are taken into account when determining the best interest of the child. 
11  Section 9(3) of the Constitution. 
12  Wynchank 2006 SAPR/PL 69. 
13  Wynchank 2006 SAPR/PL 69. 
14  Lubbe 2007 SAJP 267. 
15  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 2 SA 325 (W) 325H-J, 326H (hereafter referred to as Van 
Rooyen v Van Rooyen).  
16 In several of the cases that will be discussed throughout this contribution, specifically Van 
Rooyen v Van Rooyen and V v V 1998 4 SA 169 (C) (hereafter referred to as V v V), the issue 
before the court was the right of a homosexual parent to access (to contact) his or her minor 
child. It is noted, however, that although the right of a parent to contact a minor child falls 
beyond the scope of the study, it may serve as an useful indicator as to the objective of the 
study, as the principle of the best interests of the child applies equally in both care and contact 
matters.  Further it is noted that the common-law terms of "custody" and "care" are not used in 
the Children's Act. Even though they appear to have replaced the terms "access" and "contact", 
the court found in WW v EW 2011 6 SA 53 (KZP) (hereafter referred to as WW v EW) that 
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were living with their father, who had been granted sole custody in the divorce from 
their mother. The court stated that the children were still of a young age and 
accordingly it was in their best interests if they did not get wrong ideas regarding 
sexuality and the ways in which a man and a woman should live together. The 
applicant was permitted to exercise reasonable rights of access to her minor children 
subject to the condition that she would not share a room with her lesbian partner 
when her children slept over at their home.17  
 
Since the introduction of the new constitutional era, the changes in approach taken 
by the courts in the making of care decisions have been significant. In the post-1994 
case of V v V,18 the issue before the court related to the custody and access 
arrangements regarding the concerned parties. An order was sought by the plaintiff 
not only for custody of the children, but also to allow the defendant access under 
supervision and a provision granting that whenever the defendant exercised her 
access to the children, no third person would share the same residence or sleep 
under the same roof as the defendant and the children.19 The reason for this 
condition became apparent only after it was submitted that the children were being 
subjected to the allegedly harmful influence of a lesbian relationship between the 
mother and her partner.20 The plaintiff's objection was that the children would be 
mentally, emotionally and spiritually harmed by the influence of the lifestyle their 
mother and her lesbian companion shared, and stated that he did not wish to have 
his children exposed to what he regarded as unhealthy practices in their mother's 
home.21 The court stated that it was clear that the court in Van Rooyen v Van 
Rooyen22 made a moral judgement about what is normal and correct insofar as 
sexuality is concerned, and that the judge clearly regarded homosexuality as being 
per se abnormal.  
                                                                                                                                                        
while the concepts correspond broadly, they are not synonymous. Therefore, since the decision 
in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen and V v V is dated before the new Children's Act came into force, 
the courts still refer to the terms as "custody" and "access" instead of "care" and "contact". 
17  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 331E-G-I. 
18  V v V 173H-I. 
19  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 173I-J, 174B. 
20  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 174C-D. 
21  V v V 174F-G.  
22  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 188F-H. 
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Since the coming into operation of the Children's Act, certain common-law terms 
that existed in the amended Child Care Act,23 such as "custody", have been 
supplemented with "care", and "access", which has been supplemented with 
"contact". The court found in WW v EW24 that even though the statutory concepts 
correspond broadly with the common-law concepts, they are wider than the latter. 
The effect of the court's interpretation of the Act is that the term "custody" can be 
used interchangeably with "care", and "access" with "contact".25 
 
The term "custody", before it was supplemented26 for the term "care", related to the 
parent's control and supervision over the person and day-to-day life of a child.27 It 
related to control over the child in most areas of his/her life, such as the control of 
religion and religious education, and the restriction of the people with whom the 
minor could associate. The Children's Act, on the other hand, introduced the doctrine 
of "parental responsibilities and rights", which include to a certain extent the 
common-law doctrine of "parental authority".28 The parental responsibilities and 
rights include the duty to care for the child, maintain contact with the child, act as 
guardian to the child, and contribute to the maintenance of the child.29 The concept 
of care therefore entails a more comprehensive notion of a parent's daily life in 
relation to the child, and the powers and duties that are expected to ensure the 
general protection, well-being and best interests of the child. All decisions and 
actions regarding the child should generally be performed in the child's best 
interests, in a manner appropriate to the child's age, maturity and stage of 
development.  
 
                                                 
23  Child Care Act 74 of 1983 (hereafter referred to as the Child Care Act). 
24  WW v EW para 21. 
25  WW v EW para 21. 
26  The word "substituted" has also been used. See Skelton "Parental Responsibilities and Rights" 
66; and Heaton "Responsibilities and Rights" 3-4. 
27  Skelton "Parental Responsibilities and Rights" 66. 
28  Which included custody, access and guardianship. Also referred to as "parental power". For a 
discussion of the doctrine see Van Heerden "Parental Power" 313-325 and the authority quoted 
in n 17. 
29 Section 18(2) of the Children's Act. 
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When courts interpret the rights as set out in the Constitution, they are obliged to 
consider international law.30 South Africa has ratified international and regional 
instruments, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,31 
and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.32 Article 2(1) of the 
CRC provides that States Parties are obliged to respect and ensure the rights set 
forth in the Convention to each child, irrespective of the race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, 
disability, birth or other status of the child, or his or her parents or legal guardians.33 
The non-discrimination clause of the ACRWC is entrenched in article 3. Article 3 
provides that every child shall be entitled to enjoy the rights and freedoms set out in 
the Charter, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or guardian's34 race, 
ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national and 
social origin, fortune, birth or other status. 
 
The aim of this contribution is to discuss the sexual orientation of a parent as a 
factor for consideration in the granting of care in respect of children, and the extent 
to which courts may give consideration to such a factor. The article will also address 
the question of whether or not the role of a parent's sexual orientation in 
determining the best interests of the child has changed since care replaced custody 
as a concept in the Children's Act. In this article, care and the best interests of the 
child will be discussed first. International law will be considered thereafter, followed 
by a discussion of the approach of our courts, pre- and post-1994, in order to come 
to a conclusion and make recommendations.  
 
2 Care and the best interests of the child 
 
The effects on children of divorce and care disputes are enormous.35 This is usually 
due to the fact that parents are motivated to protect their children's emotions, and 
                                                 
30  Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
31  June 1995. Hereafter referred to as the CRC. 
32  January 2000.  Hereafter referred to as the ACRWC. 
33  Own emphasis. 
34  Own emphasis. 
35  Mahlobogwane 2005 Codicillus 30. 
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as a result the antagonism between the parents often becomes so strong that they 
cannot reach consensus as to the best interests of the children.36 One might argue 
that when a parent's sexual orientation is an additional factor in child care disputes, 
this adds to the antagonism between parents and therefore also adds to the impact 
such disputes have on children.  
 
The guiding principle in all matters involving children is that the best interests of the 
children are paramount.37 Courts are compelled to place emphasis on the standard 
of the best interests of the child, not only due to their role as upper guardians of all 
minors, but also due to the fact that this provision is entrenched in section 28(2) of 
the Constitution, as well as sections 7 and 9 of the Children's Act. What is in the best 
interests of a specific child cannot be determined with absolute certainty, and one 
needs to make use of the guidelines and factors set out in case law and legislation, 
such as in the case of McCall v McCall and section 7 of the Children's Act. The 
following section of this article includes a comprehensive discussion of the definition 
of the new concept of "care" and the old concept of "custody", and the factors and 
criteria set out in case law and legislation regarding the standard of the best 
interests of the child. 
 
2.1 Care 
 
Children have become the main focus where parental responsibilities and rights are 
concerned.38 The Children's Act introduced the doctrine of "parental responsibilities 
and rights" in section 18 and it includes, to some extent, the common-law doctrine 
of "parental authority".39 Unlike the concept of parental authority,40 which was 
                                                 
36  Mahlobogwane 2005 Codicillus 33. 
37  HG v CG 2010 3 SA 352 (ECP) 354D-E (hereafter referred to as HG v CG). See also Christian 
Education South-Africa v Minister of Education 2000 10 BCLR (CC) para 41; Minister for Welfare 
Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 7 BCLP 713 (CC) para 17; Du Toit v Minister of 
Welfare and Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC) para 20; Bannatyne v Bannatyne  
2003 2 SA 363 (CC); and De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 12 BCLR 1333 (CC). 
38  SALC Review of the Child Care Act para 8.3; Skelton "Parental Responsibilities and Rights" 62. 
39  In V v V 176C-D Judge Foxcroft stated the following: "There is no doubt that over the last 
number of years the emphasis in thinking in regard to questions of relationships between 
parents and their children had shifted from a concept of parental power of the parents to one of 
parental responsibility and children's rights. Children's rights are no longer confined to the 
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located in the common law, the Children's Act incorporates the concept of parental 
responsibilities and rights within its statutes,41 and therefore it has not been codified 
from the term parental authority. It can further be noted that the Children's Act 
refers to the phrase "parental responsibilities and rights" rather than "parental rights 
and responsibilities". Skelton42 argues that the reason for this less common 
construction of the phrase is to emphasise the importance of a parent's 
responsibilities towards a child first, and only thereafter the importance of a parent's 
rights towards a child.43 The doctrine of parental responsibilities and rights includes 
the right of the parents to care for the child, maintain contact with the child, act as 
his or her guardian and contribute to his or her maintenance.44  
 
Since this article discusses the granting of care to a homosexual parent in divorce 
proceedings, it is necessary to establish initially what was expected of parents in 
relation to the old concept of "custody" and what is expected of them in relation to 
the new concept of "care".  
 
The common-law definition of the term "custody" has been described as "relating to 
the control and supervision of the daily life and person of the child".45 A custodial 
parent had to care for, support and guide the child, and take responsibility for the 
health, education, safety and general welfare of the child.46 The court in Kastan v 
Kastan47 described the custody of a child as the taking of day-to-day decisions 
regarding children as well as decisions of longer and more permanent duration 
                                                                                                                                                        
common law, but also find expression in s 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act, 1996, not to mention a wide range of international conventions." Judge Foxcroft (at 176E) 
further stated that: "parental power … is made up of two distinct elements. The one is 
guardianship and the other is custody. Guardians take decisions regarding a child's property and 
person, whereas custodians have control over the day-to-day life of the child." 
40  For an overview of the historic development of parental authority see Kruger 2004 Fundamina 
84-112. 
41  Sections 18-21, 27, 30, 31 and 40 of the Children's Act. 
42  Skelton "Parental Responsibilities and Rights" 63. 
43  These rights should be regarded not only as in the best interest of the child, but should also be 
performed in his or her best interest, and no parental right will be enforced if it is in conflict with 
the child's interests. 
44  Section 18(2) of the Children's Act. 
45  Engar and Engar v Desai 1966 1 SA 621 (T) 625A-B. 
46  Heaton "Responsibilities and Rights" 3-5. 
47  Kastan v Kastan 1985 3 SA 235 (C) 236E-F. 
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involving their education, training, religious upbringing, freedom of association and 
generally the determination of how to ensure their good health, welfare and 
happiness. Custody is not defined in the Children's Act, although there are numerous 
references to the concept.48 
 
The definition of the term "care" can be found in section 1 of the Children's Act. The 
definition of the new term, "care", includes what used to be referred to as "custody", 
although the term is defined more broadly.49 According to this section of the Act, the 
person having the duty of care in relation to a child should be able to provide the 
child with a suitable place to live, provide living conditions that are conducive to the 
child's health, well-being and development, and provide the necessary financial 
support for the child. The person should generally be able to safeguard and promote 
the well-being of the child and to protect him or her from any maltreatment, abuse, 
neglect, degradation, discrimination, exploitation and any other physical, emotional 
or moral harm or hazards to which the child may be exposed.  The person must not 
only ensure that the fulfilment of the child's rights as set out in the Bill of Rights in 
the Constitution and Chapter 2 of the Children's Act are realised, but also guide, 
direct and secure the child's education and upbringing in a manner appropriate to 
the child's age, maturity and stage of development. The person must further guide, 
advise and assist the child in decisions that are taken by the child in a manner that is 
appropriate to the specific child's age, maturity and stage of development; guide the 
behaviour of the child in a humane manner; maintain a sound relationship with the 
child; and accommodate any special needs that the child may have. The person 
must finally ensure that in general, the best interest of the child is the paramount 
concern in all matters affecting the child.50  
                                                 
48  See ss 35(1), 35(2)(a), 39(5)(a) and 150(1)(g) of the Children's Act. S 1(2) states: "In addition 
to the meaning assigned to the terms 'custody' and 'access' in any law, and the common law, the 
terms 'custody' and 'access' in any law must be construed to also mean 'care' and 'contact' as 
defined in this Act." 
49  Skelton "Parental Responsibilities and Rights" 65-66. In J v J 2008 6 SA 30 (C), Judge Erasmus 
acknowledged the fact that "care" appeared to have a broader scope than the term "custody". 
The court found in WW v EW para 21 that while the statutory concepts of care and contact 
correspond broadly to the common-law terms of custody and access, they are not synonymous. 
The court was of the opinion that the common-law concepts have been given a wider meaning. 
See WW v EW para 26. 
50  Section 1(1) of the Children's Act. 
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It is noted, however, that although the duty of care expects more of a parent, both 
concepts (care and custody involve similar requirements. Custody has to do with a 
parent's day-to-day power over decisions regarding their children, such as the 
supervision and control of the child, and the persons with whom the child may 
associate, and basic duties such as ensuring the child's good health, welfare and 
happiness.51 
 
The parent must ensure that the child's rights as set out in the Constitution and the 
Children's Act are respected, protected, promoted and fulfilled,52 and must guide the 
child's upbringing and development. As the term "care" suggests, a parent's duties 
regarding a child as set out in the Children's Act mostly involve responsibilities rather 
than rights in respect of a child, whereas the effect of the term "custody" is to 
emphasise the authority that a parent has over a child.53 It remains to be seen if the 
South African court's approach to the concept of "care" will differ from their 
approach to the concept of "custody". Proudlock and Skelton54 are of the opinion 
that the South-African courts will have to adapt the previous concepts to the new 
definitions of care and contact. 
 
The change of concept from custody in the Child Care Act to the concept of care in 
the Children's Act provides the court with a more comprehensively detailed 
description of what the duty of care requires of a parent. When one interprets 
section 1 of the Children's Act, which defines the concept of care, along with section 
7 of the Children's Act, which defines the principle of the best interests of the child, 
it becomes evident that the courts have a detailed list of factors to work with when 
determining the granting of child care to a parent. 
 
                                                 
51  Kastan v Kastan 1985 3 SA 235 (C) 236E-F. 
52  Section 7(2) of the Constitution, Preamble to the Children's Act. 
53  Heaton "Responsibilities and Rights" 3-4. 
54  Proudlock and Skelton "Interpretation" 1-29. 
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The Children's Act places great emphasis on the relevant international human rights 
and children's rights instruments.55 The next section will include a discussion of the 
relevant international instruments. 
 
3 International law 
 
Section 39(1) of the Constitution states that: 
 
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- (a) must 
promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, quality and freedom; (b) must consider international law;56 (c) 
may consider foreign law.  
 
When courts interpret the rights as set out in the Constitution, they are thus obliged 
to consider international law.57 This is a significantly important measure, as it 
ensures that all legislation is interpreted in the same way, on national and 
international level. Further, when a state becomes a signatory to a convention, this 
indicates its intention to become a party to the treaty, and although the convention 
may not yet be legally binding, the state is obliged to refrain from acts that would 
defeat the object and purpose of such a convention.58 When a state ratifies a 
convention, it is bound under international law to respect the rights and duties set 
out in the convention.59  
 
South Africa has ratified various international and regional instruments, including the 
CRC and the ACRWC. The CRC can be described as the most important and 
successful international convention to deal with children's rights. It was adopted 
unanimously by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 
                                                 
55  Preamble to the Children's Act. 
56  Own emphasis. 
57  Section 233 of the Constitution. See also S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) (hereafter 
referred to as S v Makwanyane) para 35; Jansen van Rensburg and Lamarche "Right to Social 
Security and Assistance" 209; In S v Makwanyane, the Constitutional Court held that, in the 
context of s 39(1)(b) of the Constitution, the phrase "public international law" refers to 
international law whether it is binding on South Africa or not. Further, the Court emphasised the 
fact that the courts had to consider both "hard" and "soft" law in the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights. 
58  Rosa and Dutschke 2006 SAJHR  3. 
59  Rosa and Dutschke 2006 SAJHR  3. 
C FELDHAUS AND C VAN DEN HEEVER  PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
 
 
304 / 392 
1989.60 As was stated by Doek,61 the former Chairperson of the UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child: 
 
no other human rights treaty comes that close to universal ratification, and the 
CRC is at the same time the human rights treaty with the widest coverage. 
 
The CRC represents a vast and comprehensive list of children's rights, covering not 
only civil and political rights, but also economic, social and cultural rights. The 
central theme of this Convention is that children need priority care as they are a 
vulnerable group and are in the developmental phase of their lives.62 As is identified 
by the CRC Committee, the so-called "four pillars" of the CRC are considered general 
principles of fundamental importance for the implementation of the CRC.63 These 
four pillars accord children significantly important rights, such as the right against 
any discrimination,64 the right to have their best interests a primary consideration in 
all actions concerning them,65 the inherent right to life66 and the right of a child who 
is capable of forming his or her own views to express those views in all matters 
affecting the child.67  
 
Mezmur68 emphasises the fact that it was in order to give the CRC specific 
application within the African context, and accordingly the ACRWC, that the first 
regional treaty on the human rights of the child was adopted on the 11 July 199069 
by the OAU Heads of State and Government (now the African Union or AU). The 
                                                 
60  Entered into force on 2 September 1990. See Mezmur 2008 SAPR/PL 3. Although the CRC is the 
youngest of seven human rights treaties, it is the most successful, as it took less than ten 
months to enter into force and was ratified by 100 State Parties within two years. The CRC has 
thus far been ratified by 193 of 195 of the world's states, but excluding Somalia and the United 
States of America. 
61  Doek 2003 Saint Louis University Public Law Review 235; Van der Walt 2010 Obiter 715: "That 
the international community ratified this treaty so soon after its proposal is indicative of the fact 
that it considered this treaty as one of major importance". 
62  Van der Walt 2010 Obiter 715. 
63  Mezmur 2008 SAPR/PL 3-4. 
64  Article 2 of the CRC. 
65  Article 3 of the CRC. 
66  Article 6 of the CRC. 
67  Article 12 of the CRC. 
68  Mezmur 2006 AHRLJ 550. See also Mezmur 2008 SAPR/PL 6. The ACRWC was, however, not 
quick to receive support from African countries, as it took nine years for 15 countries to ratify the 
Charter and bring it into force. 
69  Entered into force on 29 November 1999. 
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ACRWC, which was adopted nine years after the CRC, contains provisions very 
similar to those of the CRC, and is intended to be complementary to other 
international and regional conventions. This is also applicable to other international 
conventions. They thus need to be read and interpreted together.70  
 
When States Parties ratify the CRC as well as the ACRWC, they are required to 
undertake a review of their domestic legislation and administrative measures in 
order to ensure that they comply with the obligations set out in the treaties.71 These 
obligations are provided for in article 4 of the CRC and article 1 of the ACRWC. This 
process, which has been referred to as "domestication", is performed under the 
country's constitutional provisions in the enacting and amending of legislation, and 
therefore gives international law the same status as domestic law.72 
 
The following section will focus on the similarities and, where applicable, differences 
between the provisions of the CRC and ACRWC. It will also attempt to investigate 
the rights relating to the interests of children in the granting of care to a parent in 
divorce proceedings, where the sexual orientation of a parent plays a role in the 
consideration thereof. These will include the principle of the best interests of the 
child, the right of a child to non-discrimination, and the right of a child who is 
capable of forming his or her own views to express those views freely in all matters 
concerning him or her. 
 
3.1 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
 
The adoption of the CRC has brought about a significant shift in how the global 
community thinks of and treats children, as the fundamental requirement for the 
                                                 
70  Rosa and Dutschke 2006 SAJHR  7-10. 
71  Mezmur 2008 SAPR/PL 15.  
72  Mezmur 2008 SAPR/PL 15; A 4 of the CRC states that: "States Parties shall undertake all 
appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights 
recognised in the present Convention. With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States 
Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources and, 
where needed, within the framework of international co-operation." 
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implementation of the CRC can be described as the recognition of the child as a full 
human being and respect for the rights they hold.73 Since the South African 
government ratified the CRC it has committed itself to and assumed the 
responsibilities of achieving the goals set out in the CRC.74  Signing and ratifying a 
treaty such as the CRC creates a presumption in international law that the courts will 
not give rulings that are contrary to the international treaty obligations of the State, 
and that a State Party assumes an obligation to give effect to the treaty in domestic 
law.75  
 
The preamble of the CRC refers to certain rights and freedoms that are of significant 
importance to the central theme of this study. These rights and freedoms are 
important as they emphasise the fact that children have certain material, emotional 
and psychological needs, and should grow up in a family environment filled with 
happiness, love and understanding. This should happen in an environment where 
everyone in the family is treated equally and with dignity and respect.  
 
In its preamble the ACRWC also refers to certain rights and freedoms that are of 
significant importance to children, such as: 
 
Recognising that the child occupies a unique and privileged position in the 
African society and that for the full and harmonious development of his 
personality, the child should grow up in a family environment in an atmosphere 
of happiness, love and understanding.76 
 
This contributes to the argument that children have certain material, emotional and 
psychological needs and should grow up in a family environment filled with 
happiness, love and understanding.77  
 
                                                 
73  Mezmur 2008 SAPR/PL 1. 
74  Gallinetti 2002 ESR Review 12-14. 
75  Sloth-Nielsen 2002 ICRJ 138. 
76  Own emphasis. 
77 The Children's Act states in its preamble: "it is necessary to effect changes to existing laws 
relating to children in order to afford them the necessary protection and assistance so that they 
can fully assume their responsibilities within the community as well as that the child, for the full 
and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment 
and in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding." 
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3.1.1 Non-discrimination  
 
The non-discrimination clause of the CRC is entrenched in article 2.78 Article 2(1) of 
the CRC provides that States Parties are obliged to respect and ensure and extend 
the rights set forth in the Convention to each child, irrespective of the race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, 
property, disability, birth or other status of the child, or his or her parents or legal 
guardians.79 Article 2(2) further provides that States Parties are obliged to take all 
appropriate measures to ensure that a child is protected from discrimination based 
on the status, activities, expressed opinions or beliefs of the child's parents or legal 
guardians. It is noteworthy that the CRC protects not only the child (from 
discrimination on the listed grounds) but also his or her parents or legal guardians. 
The non-discrimination clause makes provision for a non-exhaustive list of grounds 
by including the words "or other status of the child, or his or her parents or legal 
guardians". Of further importance is the fact that the CRC does not include a 
person's sexual orientation as a ground of non-discrimination, as does the South-
African Constitution. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has, however, dealt 
with this situation in its General Comment No 4 of 2003.80  The Committee 
emphasised the fact that according to article 2, States Parties have the obligation to 
ensure that all human beings under the age of 18 enjoy all of the rights provided for 
in the Convention, without any discrimination. These include non-discrimination on 
grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status. The 
Committee further states that these grounds also include adolescents' sexual 
orientation and health status.81  
 
It is submitted that since these rights are applicable not only to children but also to 
their parents, and the grounds of non-discrimination include the sexual orientation of 
                                                 
78  For a general discussion of a 2 of the CRC, see Hodgkin and Newell Implementation Handbook 
17-33; Mower International Support 24-25; and LeBlanc United Nations Lawmaking 94-107. 
79  Own emphasis. 
80  General Comment No 4: Adolescent Health and Development in the Context of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (2003) 2 (General Comment No 4).  
81  General Comment No 4 2. 
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an adolescent, it can be argued that a parent's right to non-discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation is also protected by the CRC.  
 
The non-discrimination clause of the ACRWC is entrenched in article 3. Article 3 
provides that every child shall be entitled to enjoy the rights and freedoms set out in 
the Charter, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or guardian's82 race, 
ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national and 
social origin, fortune, birth or other status. The non-discrimination clause makes 
provision for a non-exhaustive list of grounds by including the words "or other 
status". Again, as in the CRC, a person's sexual orientation is not listed among the 
grounds of non-discrimination. When taking into account the grounds for non-
discrimination as listed in the South-African Constitution, as well as the fact that the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child explained in their General Comment No 4 that 
the term "or other status" does in fact include an adolescent's sexual orientation, 
one can argue that the ACRWC, due to its open-ended list of factors included for 
non-discrimination, includes the sexual orientation of a person, although this is not 
stated explicitly.83  
 
3.1.2 The best interest  
 
In recognising the vulnerability of a child and the lack of provision for the protection 
of children's right's in general, the standard of the best interests of the child is 
protected by means of article 3, and is described by Mezmur84 as "the yardstick by 
which to measure all the actions, laws and policies affecting children". It can also be 
described as one of the most significant accomplishments of the CRC, as it applies to 
all actions concerning children, thereby including both individuals and groups.85 It is 
an accepted fact that the standard of the best interests of the child underpins all 
                                                 
82  Own emphasis. 
83  General Comment No 4 2. The non-discrimination grounds as listed in s 9(3) of the Constitution 
are: "The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth." 
84  Van der Walt 2010 Obiter 715; Mezmur 2008 SAPR/PL 18. 
85  Mezmur 2008 SAPR/PL 18. 
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decisions relating to children, and the ratification of the CRC by South Africa and 
other countries has further confirmed this. Article 3 provides that in all actions 
concerning children, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration, 
whether such action be undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, 
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies.86 The importance of 
this standard is further reinforced in article 4 of the CRC, which states that all 
governments must undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative and other 
measures for the implementation of the rights recognised in the Convention.87 The 
CRC does not directly provide any specific criteria to be taken into consideration in 
the determination of the best interests of the child. South Africa has done this by 
incorporating the said criteria in national legislation, namely in section 7 of the 
Children's Act.  Over the years the courts have developed certain guidelines or 
factors to be considered when determining what is in the best interests of the child, 
and it was only in 1994 that the court in McCall v McCall established a 
comprehensive list of factors that was deemed relevant in determining the best 
interests of a child.  
 
Article 4(1) of the ACRWC emphasises the best interests of the child, providing that 
in actions taken by any person or authority concerning a child, the child's best 
interest shall be the primary consideration. One can note that the CRC only makes 
provision for the phrase "a primary consideration", whereas the ACRWC makes 
provision for the phrase "the primary consideration".88 Even though the difference is 
                                                 
86  Article 3 of the CRC states that: "(1) In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by 
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. (2) States Parties 
undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, 
taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other 
individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate 
legislative and administrative measures. (3) States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, 
services and facilities responsible for the care and protection of children shall conform with the 
standards established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the 
number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision."  
87  Article 4 of the CRC states that: "States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, 
administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognised in the 
present Convention. With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall 
undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where 
needed, within the framework of international co-operation." 
88  Mezmur 2008 SAPR/PL 17. 
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only one word, it creates a large difference in the amount of weight to be applied to 
the principle. Whereas "a primary consideration" as provided for in the CRC implies 
that the standard of the best interest of the child is to be afforded equal weight 
along with other considerations, the phrase "the primary consideration", as 
contained in the ACRWC, implies that the standard of the best interests of the child 
must carry a greater weight than competing rights and provisions.89 
 
Article 27 of the CRC provides that States Parties must recognise the right of every 
child to a standard of living adequate for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral 
and social development. Further, the parents or other persons responsible for the 
child have the primary responsibility to secure, within their abilities and financial 
capabilities, the conditions of living necessary for the child's development.90 Article 
27 is of significant importance in relation to the provisions made for the best 
interests of the child in section 7 of the Children's Act, including the capacity of a 
parent or care-giver to provide for the needs of the child, including his or her 
emotional and intellectual needs,91 the child's physical and emotional security, and 
his or her intellectual, emotional, social and cultural development,92 and the need for 
a child to be brought up within a stable family environment or an environment 
resembling as closely as possible a caring family environment.93  
 
                                                 
89  Skelton 2009 AHRLJ 482. 
90  Article 27 of the CRC states that: "(1) States Parties recognise the right of every child to a 
standard of living adequate for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social 
development. (2) The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary 
responsibility to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living 
necessary for the child's development. (3) States Parties, in accordance with national conditions 
and within their means, shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible 
for the child to implement this right and shall in case of need provide material assistance and 
sport programs, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing. (4) States Parties 
shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of maintenance for the child from the 
parents or other persons having financial responsibility for the child, both within the States Party 
and abroad, in particular, where the person having financial responsibility for the child lives in a 
state different from that of the child, States Parties shall promote the accession to international 
agreements or the conclusion of such agreements as well as the making of other appropriate 
arrangements."  
91  Section 7(1)(c) of the Children's Act.  
92  Section 7(1)(h) of the Children's Act. 
93  Section 7(1)(k) of the Children's Act.  
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It can be argued that the preamble, read together with articles 2 and 3 of the CRC, 
contributes to the argument that every child has the right to grow up in a family 
environment surrounded by an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding. If 
one includes the sexual orientation of a person in the list of grounds for non-
discrimination relating to parents, one can further argue that not only the child but 
also his or her parents have the right to be a family without any discrimination on 
the grounds of the sexual orientation of the parents.  
 
Article 20 of the ACRWC reaffirms the responsibilities of parents, providing that 
parents or other persons responsible for the child shall have the primary 
responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child, and to ensure that 
the best interests of the child is their primary concern at all times. They further have 
the duty to secure conditions of living necessary to the child's development, within 
their abilities and financial capabilities.94 The sexual orientation of a person will not 
influence these responsibilities.  
 
3.1.3 The views of the child  
 
The CRC further makes provision in article 12 for a child who is capable of forming 
his or her own views to express those views freely in all matters that concern him or 
her, and that such views be given due weight in accordance with the child's age and 
maturity. Further, the child shall be given the opportunity to be heard in all judicial 
and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly or by means of a 
representative body.95 Children are empowered by this provision to express their 
                                                 
94  Article 20(1) of the ACRWC states that: "(1) Parents or other persons responsible for the child 
shall have the primary responsibility of the upbringing and development of the child and shall 
have the duty: (a) to ensure that the best interests of the child are their basic concern at all 
times- (b) to secure, within their abilities and financial capabilities, conditions of living necessary 
to the child's development; and (c) to ensure that domestic discipline is administered with 
humanity and in manner consistent with the inherent dignity of the child." 
95  Article 12 of the CRC states that: "(1) States Parties shall ensure to the child who is capable of 
forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the 
child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of 
the child. (2) For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be 
heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly or through 
a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of 
national law." 
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views freely and also to communicate them in judicial and any other proceedings 
where their interests are at stake.96 This provision creates certain standards against 
which the law can be measured and is of great importance in divorce litigation 
where it is necessary for courts to gain an understanding of the views and wishes of 
the children concerned in the particular matter.97 The goal of hearing the voice of a 
child is not to treat their views as decisive factors in divorce decisions, but rather to 
take the views into consideration where possible.98 Accordingly, it can be argued 
that in the divorce of their parents, children can express their views in the matter of 
with which parent who they wish to reside, either directly or by means of a 
representative, and the court can give consideration to these views with regards to 
the child's age and maturity.  
 
Further, according to article 4(2) of the ACRWC, a child who is capable of 
communicating his or her views shall be afforded the opportunity for his/her views 
to be heard in all judicial or administrative proceedings concerning the child. This 
opportunity will be afforded either directly or through an impartial representative.99 
The participation rights of children stem from the expanding recognition of the 
autonomy of every child and children's right to have a say in matters that concern 
them.100  A positive aspect of the phrasing of the ACRWC is the fact that it does not 
include the internal limitation of "in accordance with the age and maturity of the 
child", as does the CRC.101 The difference between the CRC and the ACRWC in the 
phrasing of a child's participation right must be noted. Whereas the CRC refers to a 
child who is "capable of forming" his or her views, the ACRWC refers only to a child 
who is "capable of communicating" his or her views. The effect of this difference is 
that the ACRWC is more restrictive than the CRC towards children who are not able 
                                                 
96  Pillay and Zaal 2005 SALJ 684. 
97  Pillay and Zaal 2005 SALJ 684. 
98  Pillay and Zaal 2005 SALJ 684. 
99  Article 4 of the ACRWC states that: "(1) In all actions concerning the child undertaken by any 
person or authority the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration. (2) In all 
judicial or administrative proceedings affecting a child who is capable of communicating his/her 
own views, and opportunity shall be provided for the views of the child to be heard either 
directly or through an impartial representative as a party to the proceedings, and those views 
shall be taken into consideration by the relevant authority in accordance with the provisions of 
appropriate law." 
100  Gose African Charter 124. 
101  Gose African Charter 127. 
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to communicate their views.102 It can therefore be argued that in the divorce of their 
parents, children can express their views in the matter of which parent with whom 
they wish to reside, either directly or by means of a representative, and the court 
can give consideration to these views with regards to the child's view without taking 
onto consideration the internal limitation of age and maturity.  
 
3.2 Concluding remarks 
 
It is clear from the above discussion on the CRC and the ACRWC that they 
emphasise the importance of growing up in a family environment filled with 
happiness, love and understanding in order that the child should experience a full 
and harmonious development.  If one includes the right to non-discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation, as was done in the South-African Constitution, and as is 
regarded as included in the CRC by General Comment No 4 of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, one can argue that children have the right to grow up in a family 
environment without any discrimination, regardless of the sexual orientation of the 
parents. The ACRWC makes provision for the best interests of the child to be the 
primary consideration in all actions taken by an authority or person.103 Further, a 
child who is capable of communicating his or her own views shall be afforded the 
opportunity to have his or her views heard in all judicial and administrative actions 
concerning the child, either directly or through an impartial representative. It can be 
argued that in the divorce of their parents, children can express their views in the 
matter of which parent they wish to reside with, either directly or by means of a 
representative, and that the court can give consideration to such views without 
limitation of age and maturity. As in the CRC, the ACRWC makes no mention as to a 
specific sex orientation of the parents that would be in the best interests of the child, 
such as having two parents of a different gender as against two parents of the same 
gender. The ACRWC also makes no mention of whether or not a parent's particular 
sexual orientation would be detrimental to the well-being of the child. Rather, it can 
be argued that the parents of the child should have the financial capability to 
                                                 
102  Gose African Charter 125. 
103  Own emphasis. 
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provide a child with the standard of living necessary for the child's upbringing and 
development. Furthermore, it can be argued, interpreting the ACRWC together with 
the CRC and section 28(2) of the Constitution, that the decision taken by courts 
relating to the granting of care of a child to a parent in divorce proceedings should 
be taken in the child's best interests regardless of the sexual orientation of the 
parent, and that the child should be given an opportunity to express his or her views 
regarding the decision in such a manner as is consistent with his or her age and 
maturity.  
 
The role of the South-African courts in their approach towards homosexuality and 
the suitability of homosexuals as parents has been significant. The position pre-1994 
and post-1994 will consequently be discussed further. 
 
4 Case law  
 
It is accepted that the interests of children will be best served within the family 
environment.104 Advances and changes in globalised culture compel people to take 
cognisance of the wide variety of ways in which families are formed and in which 
children grow up. Such new family arrangements are bringing about a new notion of 
what a family is.105 The Constitution does not explicitly refer to familial or parental 
rights, nor does it protect the family, particularly as a social institution.106 The 
Constitutional Court has, however, pointed out in a number of cases that the family 
is indirectly protected by means of the right to dignity of its members.107 The 
Children's Act recognises that a wide range of family forms exists, and that different 
kinds of care arrangements can be made regarding children.108 In the Supreme 
                                                 
104  Robinson 2005 JJS 110. 
105  Lubbe 2007 SAJP 260-261. One of these non-traditional family forms that has challenged 
society's traditional notion of what a family is, as she explains, is the same-gendered family. 
106  Bonthuys 2005 IJLPF 24. 
107  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 98-102; Booysen v Minister of Home Affairs 
2011 7 BCLR 654 (CC) para 3-4. 
108  Section 23 of the Children's Act; Skelton "Parental Responsibilities and Rights" 63.  
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Court of Appeal case of Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs,109 Judge of Appeal 
Cameron110 stated that:  
 
Family life as contemplated by the Constitution can be constituted in different 
ways and legal conceptions of the family and what constitutes family life should 
change as social practices and traditions change. 
 
Furthermore, one can refer to a comment made by Judge O'Regan in Dawood v 
Minister of Home Affairs:111 
 
Families come in different shapes and sizes. The definition of the family also 
changes as social practices and traditions change. In recognising the importance 
of the family, we must take care not to entrench particular forms of family at the 
expense of other forms. 
 
Furthermore, the approach of courts as well as members of society towards 
homosexuality and the suitability of homosexuals as parents is progressively 
changing. This is clearly reflected in jurisprudence in which constitutional norms and 
values are applied to the issue of homosexuality.112  
 
Since South-Africa's shift to a democratic dispensation in 1994 major changes in the 
South-African private law has taken place.113 Several constitutional provisions have 
brought about changes in the way in which courts will decide to grant a duty of care 
to a parent in divorce proceedings where the homosexuality of a parent is a 
consideration.114 The courts are obliged to assume an approach different from that 
taken prior to 1994 in considering the relationship between homosexual parents and 
their children.115 As will be illustrated in the discussion of Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen, 
the views and decision of the court regarding the sexual orientation of a parent and 
consequently the best interests of the child would clearly have been in conflict with 
                                                 
109  Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs 2005 3 SA 429 (SCA) (hereafter referred to as Fourie v Minister 
(SCA)).  
110  Fourie v Minister (SCA) 439D-E. 
111  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) 960B-D (hereafter referred to as Dawood 
v Minister of Home Affairs). 
112  Fourie v Minister (SCA); V v V; Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development 2003 2 
SA 198 (CC); P v P 2007 5 SA 94 (SCA). 
113  Robinson 2005 JJS 108. 
114  These important provisions includes ss 8, 9, 36 and 39 of the Constitution. 
115  Robinson 2005 JJS 108. 
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the provisions of the Constitution had the decision been made after the Constitution 
came into force. The different views of the court in V v V, as will be discussed 
further in the section, are clearly in line with the provisions of the Constitution, and 
are indicators of the change that has taken place in the legislature prior to 1994 as 
well as beyond this date.  
 
4.1 Pre-1994 
 
In Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen116 the applicant was seeking a definition of her right to 
access her two minor children. The applicant had enjoyed her right of access 
liberally for a period of six years after her divorce from the respondent, the father of 
the children.117 The issue before the court arose after the respondent remarried and 
had a change of mind in terms of the access arrangements regarding the mother of 
the children.118 The issue did not involve capability or the suitability of the applicant 
to be a mother to her children, but rather the fact that she was a lesbian. She was 
not only involved in a lesbian relationship, but also shared a house and room with 
her partner.119 The question before the court related to the desirability of the lesbian 
mother to have access to her minor children. The court stated that the issue simply 
came down to the fact of the style of living, the attitude towards living, the activities, 
the behaviour and whatever else was involved in the context of lesbianism.120  This 
issue, according to the court, did however raise certain difficulties. The first problem 
was that the applicant could live in whichever way she liked. She had an interest 
that the court should try to respect and protect. But, insofar as the interests of the 
children were concerned, she would have to make a choice between persisting in 
those activities or part thereof and having access on a wider basis than would 
otherwise be permitted. The court further stated that the choice with regards to her 
bedroom life would remain hers, but she could not make a choice that limited what 
                                                 
116  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 325I-J. 
117  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 326G-H. 
118  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 327A. 
119  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 326G-327A. See also Mosikatsana 1996 Acta Juridica 114. The author 
argues that this statement made by Deputy Judge President Flemming clearly reveals the judicial 
attitudes in South Africa towards parenting by gay and lesbian persons. 
120  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 329E-F. 
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should be appropriately done with regards to the children.121 The second difficulty, 
as raised by the Court, was that the access had thus far been on the basis of an 
undertaking that she would "stay away from sexuality" as far as the children were 
concerned, and therefore that certain "things"122 should not take place in their 
presence.123 The Applicant argued that no explicit sexual intimacy had taken place in 
front of or in the presence of the children, but the court stated that confusing signals 
encompassed much more than that. The signals that were given to the two minor 
children, contrary to what they should be taught as being normal and correct, was 
that two females shared a bed and obviously not for reasons of lack of space on a 
particular night, but as a matter of preference and mutual emotional attachment.124 
The court argued that this was detrimental to the children because it sent the wrong 
signal, and that one should take cognisance of the inadvisability of sending wrong 
signals.125 Further, Deputy Judge President Flemming126 stated that: 
 
What the experts say to me is so self-evident that, even without them, I believe 
that any right-thinking person would say it is important that the children stay 
away from confusing signals as to how the sexuality of the male and of the 
female should develop.127 
 
The court ordered the Respondent to permit the applicant to exercise reasonable 
rights of access to her minor children, subject to the condition that, when the 
children slept at the Applicant's residence, the Applicant was not to share a room 
with her partner. The court further ordered that when the children spent school 
                                                 
121  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 329E-H  
122  The parties were not in agreement as to what these "things" were.  
123  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 329 G-H. 
124  The court described signals of emotional attachment not only as kissing and hugging, but also as 
a way of speaking, the words of endearment used, and the manner in which people looked at 
each other.  
125  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 330A. 
126  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 328I-329A. 
127  In V v V 188F-189B Judge Foxcroft stated that: "It is so that the Court (in Van Rooyen v Van 
Rooyen) made a moral judgement about what is normal and correct insofar as sexuality is 
concerned…the learned Judge regarded homosexuality as being per se abnormal. The present 
equality clause (s 9) in the Constitution makes it quite clear that the State may not unfairly 
discriminate, directly or indirectly, on one or more grounds, including sexual orientation…In law, 
it is therefore wrong to describe a homosexual orientation as abnormal."  
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holidays with the applicant, the mother's partner was not to share the same 
residence or sleep under the same roof as the applicant and the children.128 
 
Although the decision of the court in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen was made in the 
pre-1994 period, it has been severely criticised, mainly on the grounds that the court 
made a moral judgement as to what was correct and normal in so far as the 
sexuality of the mother was concerned,129 and that it promoted homophobic bias by 
basing its findings on false stereotypes or perceived community intolerance.130 The 
decision has also been described as demonstrating that legal prescriptions in the 
pre-1994 period had become outmoded.131 Pertaining to the fact that the court 
regarded the homosexuality of the mother as abnormal, it can be argued that the 
court's pre-conceived conviction led to its decision that the children would be 
negatively affected if they were to be exposed to it.132 If section 8 of the 
Constitution is read with section 39(2) of the Constitution, it can further be argued 
that the views of the court in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen would have been in clear 
conflict with its constitutional obligation to develop the common law and accordingly 
to bring it in line with the provisions of the Constitution, had the decision been made 
after the Constitution came into force.133  Van Heerden134 explains that:  
 
In the absence of any empirical evidence that supports the notion that children 
who are raised by gay or lesbian parents are exposed to a greater danger and 
will be more likely to suffer from psychiatric, social, gender-identity or other 
disorders than children that are raised by heterosexual parents, this judgement 
smacks of blatant homophobia. 
 
Lubbe135 argues that "people automatically assume that being gay means being 
sexual". A line of argument that clearly runs in the course in Van Rooyen v Van 
Rooyen is the assumption that sexual activity might take place in the presence of the 
children. One can argue that to assume that homosexual couples would 
                                                 
128  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 331E-I. 
129  Robinson 2005 JJS 109. 
130  Mosikatsana 1996 Acta Juridica 118. 
131  Robinson 2005 JJS 108. 
132  Robinson 2005 JJS 109. 
133  Robinson 2005 JJS 110. 
134  Van Heerden et al Boberg's Law of Persons and Family 545. 
135  Lubbe 2007 SAJP 271. 
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automatically act any differently from any heterosexual couples due to their sexual 
orientation is also the product of homophobia, and (in the context of section 9(2) of 
the Constitution) clearly amounts to discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation.  
  
In the Supreme Court of Appeal case of Fourie v Minister (SCA), Judge Cameron136 
stated that: 
 
Permanent same-sex life partners are entitled to found their relationships in a 
manner that accords with their sexual orientation; such relationships should not 
be subjected to unfair discrimination. Gays and lesbians in same-sex life 
partnerships are as capable as heterosexual spouses of expressing and sharing 
love in its manifold forms. They are likewise as capable of forming intimate, 
permanent, committed, monogamous, loyal and enduring relationships; of 
furnishing emotional and spiritual support; and of providing physical care, 
financial support and assistance in running the common household. They have in 
short the same ability to establish a consortium omnis vitae. Finally, they are 
capable of constituting a family, whether nuclear or extended, and of 
establishing, enjoying and benefiting from family life in a way that is not 
distinguishable in any significant respect from that of heterosexual spouses.  
 
One can clearly derive a homophobic stance from the court's views and judgement 
regarding the homosexuality of the mother and the undesirability of having her 
children exposed to it. The court not only judged the mother's sexual orientation, 
but its decision was also solely based on the grounds of her "abnormal" sexual 
orientation and the wrong signals that it would give to her children. This is a clear 
infringement of the mother's right to non-discrimination in terms of section 9(3) of 
the Constitution, had the decision been made after the Constitution came into force. 
The Court further would have failed to promote the spirit, purport and objectives of 
the Bill of Rights by developing the common law or legislation, as it is obliged to in 
terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution.  
 
The following case will give a clear indication as to the changes that certain 
provisions have brought to parents in divorce proceedings, where their sexual 
orientation is a factor for consideration in the granting of child care. 
                                                 
136  Fourie v Minister (SCA) 439E-440C. 
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4.2 Post-1994 
 
In the case of V v V, the issue before the court related largely to the divorce of the 
parties, the custody of the children and the access arrangements.137 The plaintiff, 
the father of the children, sought an order for custody of the children, and was 
prepared to allow the defendant, the mother of the children, access under the 
supervision of the plaintiff or his nominee. The plaintiff claimed a further provision 
granting that whenever the defendant exercised her right to access to the children, 
no third person would share the same residence or sleep under the same roof as the 
defendant and the children.138  
 
One reason for the request for the inclusion of this condition was that the plaintiff 
feared that the children would be subjected to the allegedly harmful influence of a 
lesbian relationship between the mother and her partner. The other reason for this 
request was the state of mind of the defendant.139 A number of medical specialists 
supported his view that she suffered from a condition known to psychiatrists as 
"borderline personality disorder", resulting from trauma experienced in her teenage 
years.140 The plaintiff feared that the children would be mentally, emotionally and 
spiritually harmed by the influence of the lifestyle their mother and her companion 
shared.141 He further made it clear several times during the trial that he was 
concerned that his children could grow up with a homosexual orientation if subjected 
to the influence of a home where their mother openly lived with a lesbian partner, 
and stated that he did not wish to have his children exposed to what he regarded as 
unhealthy practices in their mother's home.142 It was for that reason that he insisted 
that their mother have free access to the children only when her lesbian companion 
was not physically present.143  
                                                 
137  V v V 173H-J. 
138  V v V 173I-174C. 
139  V v V 174C-E. 
140  V v V 174G-H; Judge Foxcroft stated that: "In the end, it became clear that the plaintiff's prime 
objection to joint custody was his wife's sexual orientation." 
141  V v V 174F-G. 
142  V v V 174C-D and 181F-G.   
143  V v V 181F-G. 
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The court considered several decisions in the course of arguments, two of them 
being McCall v McCall and Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen.144 With regards to McCall v 
McCall, the court referred to the list of criteria that Judge King had set out in the 
matter to make a decision that would be in the best interests of the child. The court 
stated that a number of similar "checklists" were used in situations such as the 
present, but that they represented accumulated case law and therefore served only 
as guidelines.145 Each case was different and had to be determined on its own facts. 
The court stated that it was clear that the court in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen made 
a moral judgement about what was normal and correct insofar as sexuality was 
concerned, and that there could be no doubt that the judge regarded homosexuality 
as being per se abnormal.146 Further, the court emphasised the fact that the present 
equality clause enshrined in section 9 of the Constitution, clearly stated that the 
State or any other person might not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more of the listed grounds. Therefore it was wrong in law to 
describe a homosexual person as being abnormal.147 Equally important, the court 
expressed the opinion that the difficulty in cases relating to the custody of children 
was that one was only indirectly dealing with the rights of parents. The child's rights 
were of paramount importance and needed to be protected, and certain situations 
would arise where the best interests of the child required that action be taken for 
the benefit of the child, effectively cutting across the parents' rights.148 De Vos149 
reasons that: 
 
There is nothing inherently wrong or abnormal about a lesbian relationship. But 
while the child is growing up, there will be strong recrimination from peers and 
                                                 
144  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen, as discussed above, regarded a decision that was given before the 
Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 came into force. Deputy Judge 
President Flemming, who presided in the matter, commented as follows in a situation very 
similar as the present one, as to what he perceived as the "wrong signals": "The signals are 
given by the fact that the children know that, contrary to what they should be taught as to what 
they should be guided as to be correct (that is male and female who share a bed), one finds two 
females doing this…as a matter of preference and as a matter of mutual emotional 
attachment…It is detrimental to the child because it is a wrong signal." 
145  V v V 187E-F. 
146  V v V 188F-G. 
147  V v V 188J-189B. 
148  V v V 189B-E. 
149  De Vos 1994 SALJ 691. 
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other parents against the child as it becomes known that his or her mother is a 
lesbian. The child might also become confused and distressed by his or her 
mother's unwillingness to conform to a generally accepted norm. It might 
therefore be in the best interest of the child to discriminate against the lesbian 
mother, because that will be the only way in which her children could be spared 
unnecessary suffering. 
 
The court referred to the article of De Vos, stating that there may well be situations 
where a court will override the equality clause in the best interest of protecting the 
child, but that would only be in cases regarding the meaning of the reasonableness 
of such limitation, such as in the Canadian case of R v Oakes.150 The court further 
referred to the conclusion drawn by De Vos, namely:151 
 
A discriminatory order by the Court against a lesbian mother in an application for 
access rights to her children that is solely based on her sexual orientation will 
not easily pass Constitutional muster. In the same way that the court cannot 
take cognisance of racism or religious intolerance when it decides on the access 
of a mother to her children, the Court cannot take cognisance of prejudice in our 
society. To do that would be to unreasonably limit, or perhaps to even negate 
the essential content of the right not to be discriminated against on the ground 
of sexual orientation.  
 
Against this background, the court came to the conclusion that there was no doubt 
from the evidence before the court that the defendant was a good and suitable 
mother, and by compelling her to exercise access rights to her children in the 
position of a visitor to the father's home would be unjust. The image of a mother 
being permitted to visit her children only under supervision would be unfair to her 
and also to her children, and the children would feel that their mother was being 
punished because of the underlying risk that her lifestyle would influence them in 
the wrong direction. The court reasoned that the best protection it could grant the 
children was to allow a continuing lifestyle with both parents under joint custody and 
to allow them to decide for themselves whether the lifestyle of the mother or that of 
the father was more harmful.152  
 
                                                 
150  R v Oakes 1998 4 SA 169 (C) 189I-190 (hereafter referred to as R v Oakes). 
151  De Vos 1994 SALJ 691. 
152  R v Oakes 192B-E. 
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In the Supreme Court of Appeal case of P v P,153 Judge of Appeal Van Heerden154 
made a statement that was agreed with by four other judges:  
 
In determining what care arrangement will best serve the children's interest in a 
case such as the present, a Court is not looking for the 'perfect parent'- 
doubtless there is no such being. The Court's quest is to find what has been 
called 'the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child's 
growth and development.' 
 
4.3 The application of case law to "care" in the Children's Act 
 
Even though the decisions of the court in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen and V v V were 
made before the Children's Act came into operation, the following section of this 
article will focus on applying the facts of both cases to the concept of care as it is 
currently defined in the Children's Act, to reach a conclusion as to whether the 
parents in both cases would have been regarded by the court as suitable to care for 
their children.  
 
In the cases of Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen and V v V, one can argue that there was 
no dispute between the parties as to the ability of the mother to provide the children 
with a suitable place to live or the necessary financial support; to ensure and secure 
the fulfilment and guard against infringement of the child's rights as set out in the 
Bill of Rights and the principles as set out in section 2 of the Children's Act; to guide, 
advise and assist the child in decision-making in a manner appropriate to the child's 
age, maturity and stage of development; to guide the behaviour of the child in a 
humane manner; to maintain a sound relationship with the child; and to 
accommodate any special needs that the child might have - as the mother in both 
cases had previously enjoyed access until a certain point in time.  
 
One can, however, note that the arguments before the court in both cases involved 
the ability of the mother to provide living conditions that were conducive to the 
child's health, well-being and development; to protect the child from emotional or 
                                                 
153  P v P 2007 5 SA 94 (SCA) 101J-102B (hereafter referred to as P v P). 
154  P v P 101J-102B. 
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moral harms or hazards; to guide, direct and secure the child's education and 
upbringing, including its religious and cultural upbringing, in a manner appropriate to 
the child's age, maturity and stage of development; and to ensure that the best 
interests of the child were the paramount concern in all matters affecting the child. 
This is due to the fact that the court in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen explicitly stated 
that the problem before them did not arise from a question as to the capability or 
the suitability of the applicant to be a mother to her children, but from the fact that 
she was a lesbian and shared a home and room with her partner.155 The court 
further emphasised that the issue was the style of living, the attitude towards living, 
the activities, behaviour and whatever else was involved in the context of 
lesbianism.156 The court regarded the (undesirable) signals that the children might 
receive from observing that two females were living together, which the court 
characterised as being contrary to what should be taught as normal and correct, and 
expressed the opinion that the receipt of such signals would be detrimental to the 
children.157 The issue before the court in V v V also related to the children's 
subjection to the alleged harmful influence of the mother and her partner's lesbian 
relationship.158 The second reason for the issue before the court related to the state 
of mind of the defendant, as she was said to suffer from a condition known as 
"borderline personality disorder" pertaining from trauma experienced in her teenage 
years.159 It later became apparent, however, that the plaintiff's primary objection to 
joint custody with the mother arose from his wife's sexual orientation.160 The 
plaintiff's objection was that the children would be mentally, emotionally and 
spiritually harmed by the influence of the lifestyle their mother and her companion 
shared.161 He was further concerned that his children would grow up with a 
homosexual orientation if they were to grow up in a home where their mother lived 
in an open lesbian relationship.162 Furthermore, he made it clear that he regarded 
                                                 
155  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 325G-I, 326G-H. 
156  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 329E-F. 
157  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 328I-329A, 329D-330D. 
158  V v V 174C-E. 
159  V v V 174G-H. 
160  V v V 174C-E. 
161  V v V 174F-G. 
162  V v V 174C-D, 181F-G. 
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the practices in his wife's home as unhealthy, and that he did not wish to have his 
children exposed to it.163  
 
In the light of the previous discussion of the constitutional provisions relating to 
equality and human dignity, and of the Children's Act, it is now clear that a parent 
may not be regarded as unable to care for a child solely because of his/her sexual 
orientation. When one applies the current definition of care as provided for in the 
Children's Act to the case of Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen and V v V, one may argue 
that in both cases the court would have perceived the mother as a good and suitable 
parent to care for her children, regardless of her sexual orientation. One might also 
argue that in the light of the facts of both cases and the criteria required of a parent 
to care for a child, the court would not have been able to deny any of the mothers 
care over her children. Both parents were able to provide their children with living 
conditions conducive to the child's health, well-being and development; to protect 
the child from any type of harm, including physical, emotional and moral harms and 
hazards; to guide, direct and secure the child's education and upbringing in a 
manner appropriate to the child's age, maturity and stage of development; and to 
ensure that the best interests of the child were of paramount concern in all matters 
affecting the child. Upon consideration of the views and judgement of the courts it 
becomes apparent that the transformation brought about by the Constitution and its 
provisions relating to equality in respect of homosexual parents and the extent to 
which courts should or should not consider parents' sexual orientation in the 
granting of childcare has been remarkable. It has also been shown that courts in 
general view the best interests of the child as interlinked with the rights of other 
members of the family and society as a whole.164 One can further note that the role 
of a parent's sexual orientation in determining the best interests of the child has 
changed to a great extent in response to the coming into operation of the 
Constitution rather than in response to the change of concept from custody to care 
since the coming into operation of the Children's Act. The change of term has done 
                                                 
163  V v V 181F-G. 
164  Bonthuys 2005 IJLPF 35. 
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little more than to simplify the court's task in establishing the content of the duty of 
care. 
 
5 Conclusion  
 
The object of this article has been to investigate the legal position as to whether the 
sexual orientation of a parent should be a considering factor in the granting of care 
of children, as well as to establish to what extent courts should give consideration to 
such factor. The question that arose from the article is: has the role of a parent's 
sexual orientation in determining the best interests of the child changed since the 
change in concept from custody to care after the coming into operation of the 
Children's Act? 
 
Section 9 of the Constitution very clearly prohibits unfair discrimination against 
persons, either directly or indirectly, by the State or any natural person, on several 
grounds. Of special relevance to this study is the right not to be discriminated 
against on the ground of one's sexual orientation.  
 
Since the Children's Act came into operation, certain terms have been substituted for 
previous common-law terms that existed in the amended Child Care Act. These 
terms include the concept of care, which was previously known as custody. The 
concept of care entails a more comprehensive description of a parent's daily life 
regarding the child, and the powers and duties that are expected to ensure the 
general protection, well-being and best interests of the child.  
 
The protection of the best interests of the child is one of the guiding principles in all 
matters relating to children, and has been enshrined in national legislation and 
international treaties, such as section 28(2) of the Constitution, sections 7 and 9 of 
the Children's Act, article 3 of the CRC and article 4 of the ACRWC. Although the 
different provisions in legislation refer to the standard of the best interests of the 
child in different ways, all of them relate to the simple fact that a child's best 
interests are of paramount importance in all actions concerning the child. This 
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standard has specific importance in care disputes, as it would be a guiding and 
fundamental principle and most probably the basis on which the decision of the 
court will be made. The standard of the best interests of the child does not reference 
the specific sexual orientation of a parent. It is argued that even though a parent 
applying for the care of a child is homosexual, his or her sexual orientation as a sole 
factor would not carry any weight in the light of the guiding factors provided in 
section 7 of the Children's Act. Provided that the applicant satisfies the court that he 
or she complies with the criteria set out in section 7 of the Children's Act, the person 
would be regarded as a suitable parent to care for the child.  
 
The decision of the court in V v V was clearly in line with the provisions of equality 
and dignity as provided for in the Constitution. The court gave consideration to the 
factors listed in section 7 of the Children's Act to determine what would be in the 
best interests of the child. The court emphasised the fact that the judgement of the 
court in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen was one of a moral nature about what is normal 
and correct insofar as sexuality is concerned, and that there could be no doubt that 
the judge regarded homosexuality as being per se abnormal.165 Further, the court 
emphasised the fact that the equality clause found in section 9 of the Constitution 
clearly states that the State or any other person may not unfairly discriminate 
directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more of the listed grounds, one such 
being sexual orientation. Therefore it was wrong in law to describe a homosexual 
person as being abnormal. The court regarded the mother as a good and suitable 
mother to her children, despite the fact that she was homosexual, and allowed the 
children to decide for themselves which lifestyle they wanted to pursue. V v V could 
be regarded as a landmark case, illustrating the transformation brought about by the 
Constitution and its provisions on equality, and the extent to which the courts can 
give consideration to the parents' sexual orientation in the granting of child care. 
 
Accordingly, with regards to the non-discrimination clause contained in section 9 of 
the Constitution, the right of every person to inherent dignity, and the judgement 
                                                 
165  See s 4.1 of this contribution regarding the judge's moral judgment and the effect it had on the 
child's best interest. 
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handed down in V v V, one can come to the conclusion that the courts can no longer 
deny parents care and contact with their children based solely on their sexual 
orientation. When one interprets section 1 of the Children's Act, which defines the 
concept of care, with section 7 of the Children's Act, which defines the standard of 
the best interests of the child, one notes that the courts have a detailed list of 
factors to apply in granting care to a parent. It is submitted that the role of a 
parent's sexual orientation in determining the best interests of the child has changed 
to a great extent due to the coming into operation of the Constitution,166 and to a 
lesser extent due to the change of concept from custody to care since the coming 
into operation of the Children's Act. It is further argued that the change of term has 
not changed matters in consideration of the sexual orientation of a parent in relation 
to granting the care of a child, but has merely simplified the court's task in 
establishing the content of the duty of care. 
 
 
  
                                                 
166  Changes in society's perception regarding homosexuality fall outside the scope of this 
contribution. 
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